Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Polityka zagraniczna RP, sformułowana po przemianach politycznych w 1989, określa ją polska racja stanu. Podstawowe cele polityki zagranicznej w latach 90. pozostawały niezmienne mimo zmian politycznych w parlamencie i rządzie. Są to: członkostwo w NATO oraz Unii Europejskiej, współtworzenie stabilnego systemu bezpieczeństwa europejskiego opartego na współdziałaniu NATO, UZE, OBWE oraz ONZ, utrzymywanie dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków z państwami regionu, działanie na rzecz współpracy regionalnej, zrównoważona polityka wobec Zachodu i Wschodu, popieranie procesów rozbrojeniowych, ochrona tożsamości narodowej i dziedzictwa kulturowego, rozwinięte kontakty z Polonią.
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Warka
Posty: 1577
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: Warka » 02 gru 2010, 17:06

Wikileaks: "Sikorski wznawia stare kłótnie"

Dzisiaj 14:42, aktualizacja: 2010-12-02 14:42:56

W kolejnym ujawnionym przez WikiLeaks dokumencie dotyczącym Polski, ambasada USA w Moskwie krytykuje polskiego ministra spraw zagranicznych Radosława Sikorskiego za pogarszanie stosunków międzynarodowych z Rosją.
Radosław Sikorski i Aleksander Szczygło / Fot. wikipedia.pl/ BartekbasW depeszy zatytułowanej "Polski premier (sic) Sikorski wznawia stare kłótnie", wysłanej w listopadzie 2009 roku, ambasador USA w Moskwie John Beyrle opisuje reakcje Rosjan na domniemaną wypowiedź Sikorskiego w Center for Strategic and International Studies w Waszyngtonie. Sikorski miał tam ponoć powiedzieć, że Polska potrzebuje obecności amerykańskich żołnierzy na swoim terytorium, aby "chronić ją przed rosyjską agresją". Słowa te, które jak się później okazało, zostały przekręcone, wywołały burzę wśród rosyjskich elit politycznych, które mówiły o całkowitym zwrocie w coraz lepszych stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich.

Co ciekawe, amerykański ambasador, w paragrafie sklasyfikowanym klauzulą "tajne/nie dla obcokrajowców" komentuje, że Polska już wcześniej zasłużyła na takie reakcje rosyjskich polityków, m.in. inicjując program Partnerstwa Wschodniego w UE i popierając Gruzję w konflikcie 2008 roku. Wspomniane jest też utworzenie przez Sikorskiego Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Europejskiego, które nazywane jest przez polskich dyplomatów "Biuro Zagrożeń ze Wschodu".

Depesza opisuje przy tej okazji podejrzenia pewnego dyplomaty, który starał się o pracę w tym biurze. Twierdzi on, że był podsłuchiwany przez Rosjan, bo przy okazji rozmowy z pracownikami rosyjskiego MSZ, Rosjanie wspominali o żartobliwej nazwie biura, do którego aplikował wspomniany dyplomata.

Beyrle konkluduje depeszę ubolewając, że Sikorski daje antyzachodnim elementom w Rosji argumenty przeciw lepszym stosunkom z NATO i Ameryką.

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stach
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: stach » 02 gru 2010, 17:27

WikiLeaks: Polska uznała Rosję za zagrożenie po jej interwencji w Gruzji. Nasz kraj odegrał "zaskakująco silną rolę"
Wtorek, 30 listopada (17:13)
Konflikt w Gruzji w sierpniu 2008 r. przełożył się na polsko-amerykańskie negocjacje w sprawie tarczy antyrakietowej, potwierdzając stanowisko polskiego rządu w sprawie zagrożenia ze strony Rosji oraz potrzeby posiadania rakiet Patriot w celu obrony Polski - wynika z publikacji Wikileaks.
WikiLeaks: Polska uznała Rosję za zagrożenie po jej interwencji w Gruzji. Nasz kraj odegrał "zaskakująco silną rolę"

Rzecznik MSZ Marcin Bosacki powiedział PAP, że resort nie będzie komentować tych publikacji.

Informacja taka znalazła się w nocie, sporządzonej w ambasadzie USA w Warszawie po spotkaniu b. szefa sztabu generalnego WP gen. Franciszka Gągora z attache wojskowym. Notę opublikował na swojej stronie internetowej rosyjski magazyn "Russkij Reporter". Według magazynu, redakcja otrzymała od Wikileaks pakiet amerykańskich dokumentów dyplomatycznych poświęconych stosunkom Rosji z krajami ościennymi.

W notatce czytamy ponadto: "Gruzja zwróciła się do Polski zarówno o wyrzutnie rakiet przeciwlotniczych GROM jak i przeciwpancerne pociski kierowane FAGGOT; gdyby Polska zdecydowała się dostarczyć tę broń, zwróci się do USA z prośbą o przetransportowanie jej do Gruzji drogą powietrzną. Gągor wezwał do (wzmożenia) polsko-amerykańskich wysiłków w celu przekonania Niemiec do poparcia przyspieszonego MAP (Planu na Rzecz Członkostwa w NATO, ang. Membership Action Plan - PAP) dla Ukrainy; gdyby Gruzja została przyjęta do MAP w kwietniu, nie doszłoby do rosyjskiego ataku" (wojny Rosji z Gruzją w sierpniu 2008 roku).

"Spytany o dalsze kroki i zamiary Rosjan - czytamy w notatce - Gągor powiedział, że Saakaszwili podjął wyjątkowo złą decyzję o wkroczeniu do Osetii Południowej i zadziałał dokładnie tak, jak wyobrażali to sobie Rosjanie". "Według polskich władz, Saakszwilego zmanipulowali rosyjscy agenci, być może nawet wśród jego doradców, umożliwiając działania wojskowe w Gruzji w celu destabilizacji gruzińskiego rządu" - napisano w depeszy.

"Polska jest przekonana, że sukces Rosji w Gruzji zwiększy wpływy twardogłowych w Moskwie" - czytamy również w dokumencie.

Z dokumentu wynika, że "Polska jest przekonana, iż za wydarzenia odpowiada (premier Rosji Władimir) Putin, i że (prezydent Dmitrij) Miedwiediew jedynie wykonuje jego polecenia". "Gągor nie wiedział, czy rosyjska armia wejdzie do Tbilisi, lecz oznajmił, że gruzińska armia nie jest w stanie przeciwdziałać dalszym rosyjskim działaniom wojskowym" - czytamy.

"Gen. Gągor zwrócił uwagę, że rosyjskie działania w Gruzji dowodzą, iż ocena Polski na temat zagrożenia z Rosji była właściwa, natomiast ocena USA i NATO była mylna. Sytuacja w Gruzji pokazuje, że Rosja jest nieprzewidywalna oraz że użycie siły militarnej pozostaje dla Moskwy kwestią otwartą. Obecnie polskie władze są nawet bardziej przekonane, iż bezpieczeństwo Polski musi zostać wzmocnione, a rozmieszczenie w Polsce Patriotów jest jeszcze ważniejsze" - napisano w dyplomatycznej nocie.

"Polska przyjęła zaskakująco silną rolę", "zaskakująca jedność na linii prezydent-rząd"

Z amerykańskich materiałów dyplomatycznych ujawnionych przez serwis Wikileaks wynika, że ambasada USA w Warszawie oceniała, iż w sierpniu 2008 roku Polska "przyjęła zaskakująco silną rolę przywódczą podczas konfliktu w Gruzji".

Amerykańscy dyplomaci zauważyli wówczas, że "prezydent (Lech) Kaczyński koordynował regionalne demonstracje solidarności z Tiblisi", w tym podróż do stolicy Gruzji z prezydentami Ukrainy i krajów bałtyckich oraz "głośno potępił" rosyjskie działania militarne.

"Wykazując niespotykaną jedność na linii prezydent-rząd, prezydent, premier i minister spraw zagranicznych koordynowali wspólne inicjatywy wśród krajów wschodnioeuropejskich i stanowczo naciskali na UE i NATO, by wzmocniły wysiłki mające na celu zakończenie walk" - relacjonowali pracownicy ambasady USA w Warszawie.

Powołując się na ówczesnego wiceministra spraw zagranicznych Andrzeja Kremera pisali również, że szef polskiego MSZ Radosław Sikorski musiał "przezwyciężyć sympatię niektórych krajów członkowskich UE dla rosyjskich działań 'defensywno/ofensywnych' w Gruzji" i udało mu się przekonać do swoich argumentów ministrów spraw zagranicznych unijnej "27".

Kremer miał podkreślać, że kilka państw UE uważało, iż prezydent Gruzji Micheil Saakaszwili był odpowiedzialny za konflikt i skłonne były uznać, że Rosja prowadzi działania "defensywno-ofensywne".

W dokumencie ambasady napisano również, że Sikorski forsował propozycję zastąpienia "rosyjskich sił pokojowych w Gruzji, siłami dowodzonymi przez UE".

Kremer w rozmowie z jednym z amerykańskich dyplomatów miał też podkreślać, iż rosyjskie działania w Gruzji nie mogą zniszczyć gruzińskiej kandydatury do Planu na Rzecz Członkostwa (z ang. Membership Action Plan, MAP), który jest pierwszym formalnym krokiem na drodze do przyjęcia do NATO. W przeciwnym razie Rosjanie zyskają na swoich działaniach i zachęci ich to do podobnych reakcji w innych miejscach w regionie.

W komentarzu do notatki amerykańscy dyplomaci napisali, iż "Polacy najwyraźniej obawiają się, by Rosji nie udało się przedefiniować status quo w Osetii Płd. i jednoczenie pokrzyżować aspiracji Gruzji i Ukrainy do MAP".

Zaznaczono też, iż strona polska miała nadzieję, iż UE zaoferuje wysłanie swoich sił pokojowych oraz "będzie chciała postawić ważne karty przetargowe w dialogu UE-Rosja, jak relacje energetyczne i umowa dotycząca partnerstwa, by przekonać Rosję do przyjęcia takich sił". Według Amerykanów oba te cele były "zbyt wygórowane".

źródło informacji: INTERIA.PL/PAP

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Husarz
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: Husarz » 02 gru 2010, 17:31

Wikileaks: Nacisk na Polskę - gaz
NAJNOWSZE WYCIEKI Z AMBASADY USA W MOSKWIE

Rosja ma wiele środków nacisku [na Polskę], w tym opóźnienie w zatwierdzeniu umowy gazowej - czytamy w jednej z depesz z listopada 2009 roku, które ujawnił portal Wikileaks. Nota wysłana z ambasady amerykańskiej w Moskwie opisuje reakcje na zacytowane przez Interfax słowa Radosława Sikorskiego o tym, że rosyjsko-białoruskie ćwiczenia wojskowe w 2009 r. były skierowane przeciwko Polsce i dlatego nad Wisłą powinny stacjonować siły amerykańskie. Wypowiedź ta jednak, nigdy nie padła i a za jej przytoczenie przepraszała rosyjska agencja Interfax.
W depeszy (CZYTAJ) czytamy, że rosyjskie media oraz urzędnicy są zaniepokojeni wypowiedzią szefa polskiej dyplomacji z początku listopada 2009 r. w Centrum Studiów Strategicznych i Międzynarodowych w Waszyngtonie.

W nocie napisano, że "w szczególności odnotowują" one wniosek Sikorskiego do sił amerykańskich o "obronę przeciwko rosyjskiej agresji " i jego stwierdzenie, że ostatnie ćwiczenia białorusko-rosyjskie ćwiczenia Zapad-2009 "były skierowane przeciwko Polsce". "Niektórzy rosyjscy urzędnicy szybko zwrócili uwagę, że komentarz Sikorskiego podkopuje nie tylko relacje z Polską, ale szkodzi również relacjom Rosja-USA i Rosja-NATO" - czytamy w depeszy.


Dalej czytamy w depeszy, że szef rosyjskiego MSZ Siergiej Ławrow powiedział dziennikarzom, że nie wierzy, by Sikorski faktycznie wypowiedział takie słowa. Dodał, że jeśli jednak coś takiego miało miejsce, to byłoby to dla niego "głębokim zdumieniem, bo rozmawiał z Sikorskim już wcześniej o problemach dotyczących bezpieczeństwa europejskiego".

Dimitrij Rogozin – przedstawiciel Rosji w NATO – nazwał słowa Sikorskiego "absurdem" i oznaką zwrotu w polityce Polski wobec Rosji. Konstantin Kosaczow z Komitetu ds. Stosunków Międzynarodowych Dumy uznał, że oświadczenia polskiego ministra „bezpośrednio zaprzeczają” poprawie relacji Rosja-USA i Rosja-NATO.

Interfax przekręcił słowa ministra

O apelu Radosława Sikorskiego było głośno zaraz po tym, jak wystąpił on w waszyngtońskim instytucie. "Chcielibyśmy, żeby Ameryka rozmieściła u nas swoje wojska jako tarczę przed rosyjską agresją" - cytowała słowa ministra rosyjska agencja informacyjna Interfax.

Zaraz pojawiły się sprostowania ze strony polskiej. Piotr Paszkowski, wtedy rzecznik prasowy MSZ mówił, że "ani minister, ani on nie przypominają sobie takich słów". Sam Radosław Sikorski powiedział, że jego słowa zostały przekręcone.

Później Interfax przyznała, że cytat ministra o amerykańskich wojskach umieściła w swojej depeszy omyłkowo. Agencja poinformowała, że dany cytat nie odpowiada rzeczywistości, przeprosiła za błąd, który nie był zamierzony, a - jak cytuje agencję Interfax IAR - "wynikał z niepoprawnej pracy reportera".


Środki nacisku

Tymczasem na końcu depeszy amerykańskiej ambasady czytamy, że rosyjskiemu rządowi „zajmie trochę czasu by przetrawić komentarz Sikorskiego i ocenić czy zmieniać obecny pozytywny trend w dwustronnych relacjach”. "Rosja ma wiele środków nacisku, w tym opóźnienie w zatwierdzeniu umowy gazowej" – czytamy. Cała nota kończy się stwierdzeniem, że Sikorski dostarczył Rosji antyzachodniej amunicji przeciwko ulepszonym relacjom z NATO i USA.

Podsłuchiwali?

W ujawnionej depeszy można także przeczytać o Biurze Bezpieczeństwa Europejskiego, które stworzyło polskie MSZ i które polscy dyplomaci żartobliwie nazywają "Biurem Zagrożeń ze Wschodu".

Według dyplomaty X, który został zaproszony do pracy w tym biurze będąc na placówce w Moskwie, rosyjskie MSZ dało mu do zrozumienia, że wie o tym departamencie i o tym, że on tam został zatrudniony.

Sikorski wzywa NATO do obrony polskich granic

Dyplomata X powiedział Amerykanom, że jedynym sposobem, żeby MSZ Rosji dowiedziało się o tym, mogło być podsłuchiwanie jego rozmów telefonicznych z Warszawą, podczas których pytano go, czy przyjmie pracę w biurze.

972 depesze z Polski

Od kilku dni portal Wikileaks publikuje informacje z poufnej korespondencji dyplomatycznej z placówek USA na całym świecie. Wiele z nich posiada klauzulę tajne. Początkowo mówiło się, że do mediów trafić może nawet do 2 milionów dokumentów – co byłoby największym przeciekiem w historii. Ostatecznie skoczyło się na 251 tysiącach.

W sumie najważniejsze światowe media dostały ponad 200 tys. dokumentów. 972 depesze pochodzą z Polski.

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stach
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: stach » 02 gru 2010, 18:10

Oryginalna depesza dotycząca Polski:
VZCZCXRO1348
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHMO #2747 3101436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061436Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5331
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002747

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: POLISH PM SIKORSKI REOPENS OLD FIGHTS

REF: A. MOSCOW 1397
¶B. MOSCOW 2240
¶C. MOSCOW 642
¶D. WARSAW 1122

Classified By: Political MC Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

¶1. (SBU) Russian media and officials are concerned with
Polish FM Radoslaw Sikorski's November 4 comments to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
In particular, they noted Sikorski's request for U.S. forces
on the ground in Poland to "protect against Russian
aggression" and his characterization that the recent
"Zapad-2009" exercises were directed against Poland. Some
Russian officials were quick to point out that Sikorski's
comments undermined not only improved Polish relations (Ref A
and B), but harmed Russian-U.S. and Russian-NATO relations as
well.

¶2. (SBU) While the Russian MFA has not yet issued a formal
statement, FM Sergey Lavrov told the press that he did not
believe that Sikorski had actually made the remarks. Lavrov
commented, however, that if proved true, "it throws me into
deep astonishment because we had talked in a detailed manner
about the problems that needed to be addressed in the context
of European security." Russian Permanent Representative to
NATO Dmitry Rogozin called Sikorski's remarks "absurd" and a
u-turn in Polish policy toward Russia and its engagement with
NATO and Europe. Duma International Relations Committee
Chair Konstantin Kosachev told the press that Sikorski's
statements "directly contradicted" the improvement in
Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO relations.

¶3. (S/NF) Unfortunately, the Polish government had seeded
some of this Russian response through their sponsorship of
and statements in support of the EU's Eastern Partnership
Initiative (Ref C) and show of support to Georgia during the
2008 Russia-Georgia War. Further, the Polish MFA has
established a Bureau of European Security, which Polish
diplomats jokingly refer to as the "Office of Threats from
the East." According to XXXXXXXXXXXX diplomat XXXXXXXXXXXX
(PROTECT), who was recruited to work in this bureau while
serving in Moscow, the Russian MFA threw this new moniker
back at him during a meeting. XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to us that the
only way the MFA could have known about the reference was to
have been listening in on his phone conversations with Warsaw
while he was interviewing for the job.

¶4. (C) Comment: The GOR will take some time to digest
Sikorski's comments, and evaluate whether or not to alter the
current positive trend in bilateral relations. Russia has
many levers, including delaying the approval of a pending gas
deal (Ref D). Sikorski has given anti-western elements in
Russia ammunition against improved Russian relations with
NATO and even with the U.S.
Beyrle

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Artur Rogóż
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: Artur Rogóż » 03 gru 2010, 21:04

Adres WikiLeaks.org usunięty z sieci

Serwis WikiLeaks nie jest obecnie osiągalny pod własną nazwą. Firma EveryDNS, która zajmowała się obsługą portalu, wycofała się ze świadczenia (bezpłatnych) usług dla witryny whistleblowerów.

Na razie można się połączyć tylko ze stroną startową i niektórymi podstronami WikiLeaks – należy podać wprost adres IP 46.59.1.2. Natomiast pod adresem 213.251.145.96 znajdziemy sekcje związane z ujawnionymi depeszami dyplomacji amerykańskiej i raporty War Diary poświęcone wojnie w Iraku i Afganistanie. Osiągalna jest także strona z ujawnionym wcześniej materiałem wideo z Iraku.


Jaką twierdzi operator DNS, przyczyną wstrzymania usług, jest fakt, że witryna WikiLeaks stała się celem zmasowanych ataków DDoS. Te już dokonane i mogące nastąpić stawiają pod znakiem zapytania stabilność infrastruktury EveryDNS. W warunkach świadczenia usługi zapisano, że żaden użytkownik EveryDNS nie może zagrażać korzystaniu z niej przez innych, więc wypowiedzenie umowy whistleblowerom odbyło się w zgodzie z regulaminem – utrzymuje EveryDNS. Operatorzy WikiLeaks zostali o tym poinformowani za pośrednictwem e-maila, Twittera i chatu.

Sami administratorzy demaskatorskiego portalu powiadomili o anulowaniu usługi DNS za pośrednictwem Twittera. Proszą także o wpłaty na konto. Na razie nie wiadomo, kiedy strona będzie osiągalna w normalny sposób.

Uzupełnienie

Dokumenty ujawnione przez WikiLeaks znajdziemy także na stronie wikileaks.ch. Domena ta została zarejestrowana przez szwajcarską Partię Piratów, a obsługujące ją serwery nazw należą do EveryDNS.

wydanie internetowe www.heise-online.pl

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naiwniak
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: naiwniak » 04 gru 2010, 17:48

Hahaha, jeśli ktoś wierzył, że powody np rezygnacji z tarczy w Polsce były inne, to gratuluję ciemnogrodu. Powoli wszystkie syfy wyjdą na wierzch, i czy to będą Ruscy, Polacy, Amerykanie, czy Niemcy, czy ktokolwiek, każdy nagle dowie się, że był okłamywany przez rząd... Wielkie zaskoczenie, też mi nowina. Wyznawcy teorii spiskowych niestety mają bardzo dużo racji. Po prostu kasa rządzi. A może myślicie, że UFO to przybysze z innych planet? A może myślicie, że nie ma alternatywy dla gazu, czy energii atomowej? A może myślicie, że atak na Pearl Harbor, czy WTC były zupełną niespodzianką dla USA? A może wierzycie w to, że prezio został wybrany w demokratycznych wyborach uczciwie? Albo, że żarówka energooszczędna jest ekologiczna? A może wierzycie, że rząd USA nie mógł i nie potrafił zapobiec wyciekowi, w dodatku informacje, które wypuszczono są tak istotne? A może wierzycie, że dolar jest własnością USA? HAHAHA.... Światem rządzi pieniądz, w dodatku jest własnością tylko kilkuset osób. Reszta to marionetki. Łącznie z nami wszystkimi. Pozdrawiam naiwniaków

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ziomeka
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Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: ziomeka » 07 gru 2010, 10:50

WikiLeaks znów o Polsce: Chcieli planu obrony dla siebie, nie regionu
psm, mar, IAR
2010-12-07, ostatnia aktualizacja 38 minut temu

USA i NATO opracowały plany obrony Polski i państw bałtyckich przed Rosją - wynika z informacji ujawnionych przez WikiLeaks. Określono go nazwą "Eagle Guardian". To pierwsze poufne plany wojskowe dotyczące obrony wrażliwych regionów Europy Wschodniej przeciwko Rosji - pisze dziennik "Guardian". Z depesz wynika też, że Polska oceniła je sceptycznie i chciała oddzielnego planu tylko dla siebie.


Według jednego z dokumentów, podpisanego w styczniu tego roku przez amerykańską sekretarz stanu Hillary Clinton, NATO zdecydowały się rozciągnąć plan obrony - operację "Eagle Guardian" - także na Litwę, Łotwę i Estonię. Nieoficjalne porozumienie w tej sprawie miało zostać zawarte podczas tegorocznego szczytu NATO w Lizbonie - wynika z dokumentów, ujawnionych przez WikLeaks.

Dziewięć NATO-wskich dywizji do obrony krajów regionu

Dziewięć NATO-wskich dywizji z USA, Wlk. Brytanii, Niemiec i Polski zostało wyznaczonych do działań bojowych na wypadek zbrojnej agresji przeciwko Polsce lub krajom bałtyckim. Polskie i niemieckie porty zostały wyznaczone do przyjęcie piechoty morskiej oraz brytyjskich i amerykańskich okrętów. Według źródeł, na które powołuje się "Guardian", pierwsze ćwiczenia NATO w ramach tego planu miałyby się odbyć na Bałtyku w przyszłym roku.


Sekretny plan NATO - cały artykuł w "The Guardian"

Brytyjski dziennik przypomina, że plany dotyczące wyznaczenia dziewięciu dywizji i roli portu w Świnoujściu przeciekły już wcześniej do "Gazety Wyborczej".

Decyzja o naszkicowaniu planów awaryjnych miała być podjęta na wniosek Stanów Zjednoczonych i Niemiec w siedzibie NATO oraz zakończyć lata podziałów wewnątrz sojuszu dotyczących tego, jak postrzegać Rosję - pisze "The Guardian". Dotychczasowe apele krajów Europu Wschodniej o wzmocnienie gwarancji bezpieczeństwa były powstrzymywane przez kraje zachodnie, przede wszystkim Niemcy, które nie chciały prowokować Rosji. Zostały postawione na ostrzu po prawdopodobnie rosyjskich cyberatakach na Estonię z 2007 roku, wojnie w Gruzji i ubiegłorocznych manewrach, podczas których Rosjanie mieli symulować inwazję na kraje bałtyckie i atak nuklearny na Polskę.

Decyzja o zmianie podejście została podjęta przez dowódców wojskowych, a nie przez Radę Północnoatlantycką.

Polska sceptyczna i niezadowolona z "roślin doniczkowych"

Z ujawnionych dokumentów wynika, że były wiceminister obrony Stanisław Komorowski powiedział amerykańskim dyplomatom w Warszawie, iż ma wątpliwości, czy szeroki plan regionalny jest najlepszym rozwiązaniem. Oświadczył też, że Polska chciałaby planu obrony, opracowanego konkretnie dla jej terytorium.

Podczas równoległych rozmów z Warszawą Waszyngton miał też zaproponować wzmocnienie polskiego bezpieczeństwa przeciwko Rosji przez rozmieszczenie specjalnych sił morskich w Gdańsku i Gdyni, wysłanie do Polski myśliwców F-16 oraz przeniesienie do niej samolotów transportowych C-130 Herkules z baz w Niemczech.

Według depesz ujawnionych przez Wikileaks wartość baterii rakiet Patriot rozmieszczonych przez Stany Zjednoczone w Polsce jest czysto symboliczna. Przeznaczone są one wyłącznie do celów szkoleniowych.

Ówczesny ambasador USA w Polsce Victor Ashe miał relacjonować, iż Komorowski denerwował się, że Amerykanie mogli równie dobrze dostarczyć Polsce "rośliny doniczkowe".

Clinton: Zachować tajemnicę, by nie drażnić Rosji

W jednej z depesz amerykańska sekretarz stanu Hillary Clinton wydaje przedstawicielom dyplomatycznym USA wskazówki dotyczące planu "Eagle Guardian" i przypomina o konieczności zachowania projektu w tajemnicy. W depeszy znajduje się zastrzeżenie, że gdyby te wojskowe plany były omawiane publicznie, doprowadziłoby to do wzrostu napięcia między NATO i Rosją. Byłoby to niekorzystne zwłaszcza w sytuacji, gdy Sojusz potrzebuje wsparcia Moskwy w takich dziedzinach jak polityka wobec Iranu - wynika z dokumentu.

Gazeta przypomina, że w Lizbonie NATO i Rosja zgodziły się współpracować w kwestiach dotyczących obrony przeciwrakietowej i innych związanych z bezpieczeństwem. W Lizbonie przywódcy wychwalali też nowy początek w relacjach Rosja-NATO nadszarpniętych po wojnie z Gruzją w 2008 roku; wcześniej Barack Obama ogłosił "reset" w relacjach z Moskwą.

WikiLeaks publikuje też dokumenty, dotyczące planów rozmieszczenia elementów budowy tarczy antyrakietowej w Polsce. W depeszy z lutego 2008 przedstawiciel polskich władz pisze, że nasz kraj chce, by na jego terytorium były rakiety średniego zasięgu, a nie obiekty o znaczeniu lokalnym. Dokumenty, ujawnione przez WikiLeaks, dowodzą, że rakiety Patriot, rozmieszczone w Polsce, mają znaczenie wyłącznie symboliczne i mogą być używane tylko do celów szkoleniowych.

Awatar użytkownika
Husarz
Posty: 822
Rejestracja: 31 paź 2010, 04:37

Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: Husarz » 08 gru 2010, 06:46

Kolejne wycieki dotyczące Polski:
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DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ, KARAGIANNIS)
OSD FOR MITCHELL, AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW, ADMIRAL MULLEN
EUCOM FOR ADMIRAL STAVRIDIS
USAREUR FOR GENERAL HAM

EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS PREL, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PL

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS DEFENSE MINISTER KLICH

Classified By: Classified BY Political Counselor Dan Sainz, reason 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Defense Minister Bogdan Klich told the Ambassador on February 18 that Poland is eager to see the fruits of bilateral defense cooperation, which he described as based on a solid political foundation. He emphasized the importance to Poland of an April arrival of the first Patriot battery rotation. Klich did not repeat recent Polish government points about the configuration of future rotations of the Patriot battery. End Summary.

¶2. (C) During a February 18 meeting with the Ambassador, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich said there is a good political framework for continued U.S.-Polish defense cooperation, and noted Under Secretary Tauscher’s February 8 visit had been a very successful one. Klich said he does not expect anything will happen to undermine that solid foundation. He added that the bilateral supplemental SoFA, signed December 11, provides a strong legal framework for defense ties. The SoFA ratification vote in the Sejm (the lower house of Parliament) was overwhelmingly in favor, and Senate approval would also come quickly. (Note: The Senate voted 88-1 in favor of SOFA ratification later on February 18.) Klich said President Kaczynski would sign the SoFA ratification bill quickly.

HOPING FOR PATRIOTS IN APRIL
----------------------------

¶3. (C) Klich said Poland has a strong desire to see the fruits of bilateral defense cooperation, and he highlighted the political importance of an early first rotation in Poland of the U.S. Patriot battery. He said Poland hopes the first rotation will occur in April. The Ambassador said the United States wants the rotation to be viewed as a bilateral success. In answer to Klich’s questions about timing, the Ambassader said the United States has said the first rotation would take place within 90 days of SOFA ratification. He said a more precise time frame will be determined at the last bilateral planning meeting for the Patriot rotation, which will take place in the first week in March.

MILITARY FACILITIES FOR ALTERNATIVE U.S. PRESENCES
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶4. (C) Klich called for talks on other forms of an enhanced U.S. security presence in Poland. He said he had authorized Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski and ChoD Franciszek Gagor to take part in such talks. Klich highlighted Polish interest in all of the options presented by DOD A/S Vershbow at the October High Level Defense Group discussions: F-16s, C-130’s, as well as “stable, not temporary” special operations forces. When asked, Klich confirmed that the GoP is particularly interested in U.S. F-16 rotations. Speaking personally, he said he also had a strong interest in a special operations force presence, since he had signed a bilateral special operations cooperation agreement with Secretary Gates a year ago. ChoD Gagor added that the biggest multilateral exercise Poland is hosting this year, “Jackal Stone 10,” will feature special operations forces. Klich added that as part of the first in-depth infrastructure review in postwar Poland, the Defense Ministry had decided to close 20% of defense facilities, but would be &saving8 three complexes for U.S. forces.

GETTING THE WORD OUT ON DEFENSE COOPERATION
-------------------------------------------

¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that the bilateral agenda for defense cooperation is a full one, and both governments should work together to inform public opinion about the many useful exchanges under way. Klich strongly agreed that Defense Ministry and Embassy staff should follow up in this area. Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski added that if A/S Vershbow visits Warsaw in the coming months, it might be a good occasion to do some joint public diplomacy work about planning for other forms of an enhanced U.S. security presence in Poland. (Note: Amb. Vershbow’s planned mid-March trip has been postponed.)

¶6. (C) COMMENT: Klich’s emphasis on a hoped-for April arrival
WARSAW 00000110 002 OF 002
of the first Patriot battery is consistent with other government statements and press leaks that signal a decision to focus on the timing of the first deployment, as opposed to other aspects of it. In that regard, Klich did not repeat government appeals that Patriot rotations be integrated into the Polish air defense system and include “live” missiles, as he did in a meeting the previous week with Under Secretary Tauscher. The emphasis on the timing of the first deployment corresponds with developments in the presidential race, and Foreign Minister Sikorsky,s active candidacy for the Civic Platform nomination. FEINSTEIN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000094

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CE, ISN/CTR; NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL

EO 12958 DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS AF, CH, IR, IZ, MARR, NATO, PARM, PL, PREL, RS

SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER MEETS FM SIKORSKI, MOD KLICH
REF: STATE 12108

Classified By: Ambassador Lee Feinstein; Reason 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During February 8 meetings with Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher and Ambassador Lee Feinstein, Foreign Minister Sikorski and Defense Minister Klich said they were pleased with the successful completion of the protocol amending the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Sikorski said he wanted to move forward on discussions regarding U.S. alternative presence options in Poland after the Patriot rotation begins. He said he would support increased pressure on Iran. He expressed skepticism about Russia’s approach toward Tehran, especially in light of China’s recent assertiveness. Klich said the second planned Patriot rotation would likely take place in the heat of the fall Polish Presidential election season and asked Washington’s help in managing public expectations. Klich also requested more armored vehicles and road-clearing equipment to support Polish operations in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.

SIKORSKI ON U.S. PRESENCE, RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

¶2. (C) U/S Tauscher and Ambassador Feinstein met Foreign Minister Sikorski for a courtesy call following the conclusion of the Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group (SCCG) on February 8. Sikorski told U/S Tauscher and Ambassador Feinstein that he was gratified that the United States and Poland had reached ad ref agreement on the protocol amending the BMDA. Sikorski said Poland wanted more information about proposed U.S. alternative presence options in Poland, and asked for more details. He expressed interest in an F-16 presence, but also asked about C-130s, and Special Forces.

¶3. (C) Sikorski asked how the United States assesses its efforts to engage Russia. He expressed concern that the United States would feel pressured to make concessions, at Poland’s expense, to gain Russia’s support in the Security Council in the face of an increasingly “hostile” China. He proposed an intelligence exchange regarding whether Russia has tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad oblast, and complained about the planned French sale of Mistral amphibious assault ships to Russia. U/S Tauscher said that the United States was realistic about Russia. Moscow was increasingly frustrated with Tehran, she said, adding that Washington had made some progress on this and other issues with the Russian Government. Ambassador Feinstein said that trans-Atlantic solidarity would be more important -- not less -- in the circumstances of a more assertive China.

¶4. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche to Sikorski on the human rights situation in Iran and pressed Sikorski to issue a public statement on the issue. Sikorski affirmed Poland’s support for increased pressure on Iran. He also suggested a special focus on Iranian civil society during the Community of Democracies conference to be held in Poland in June.

¶5. (C) Sikorski said that the London Conference on Afghanistan was useful because it finally convinced Karzai that it was his last chance to make necessary reforms and take more responsibility for Afghanistan’s security situation. DFM Najder raised Ukraine’s transfer of T-72 tanks to Iraq, offering that Poland could sell the same type of tanks if Ukraine could not meet its obligations.

¶6. (C) Sikorski reiterated that PM Tusk is eager to hold a bilateral meeting with President Obama on the margins of the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The Prime Minister’s Chancellery is exploring ways to extend Tusk’s U.S. trip by including stops in additional cities, with the aim of creating a larger window within which to schedule an Oval Office meeting.

KLICH: PATRIOTS, POLITICS, AND EQUIPMENT REQUESTS
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶7. (C) U/S Tauscher and the Ambassador met with Defense Minister Bodgan Klich on February 8 before the opening of the
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SCCG. Klich said he expected the Polish Sejm and Senate to ratify the supplemental SOFA agreement by the end of February or early March, and hoped President Kaczynski would quickly sign. Klich said he understood the configuration of the first Patriot rotation, but noted that the second rotation would occur in the heat of the presidential election. For that second rotation, he argued, it was important to manage public expectations during a sensitive political period. U/S Tauscher and the Ambassador made it clear that the Patriots would not be integrated into Poland’s air defense system. Such a move would require a U.S. Presidential decision, and the President has made no such decision. It would be important for Poland to work with the United States to cultivate realistic public expectations for future Patriot rotations.

¶8. (C) Klich expressed satisfaction with the results of the NATO defense minister’s meeting in Istanbul Klich and Gagor said that Poland would like to extend the loan term of its existing Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAPs) vehicles. There are currently 30 on loan until November 2010 and Poland needs an additional 50 MRAPs if possible by April/May when it plans to increase its troop contributions to Afghanistan. He also requested one Road Clearing Package (RCP).

¶9. (C) Turning to defense cooperation with third countries, Klich said that the Baltic states were very pleased with the U.S. proposal for NATO contingency planning, which is crucial for reassuring NATO’s eastern members. He also noted that Poland wants the United States to have the status of “associative party” in the newly established Polish/Ukrainian/Lithuanian brigade. Klich emphasized that Poland is thinking outside of Europe and wants to have a deeper dialogue with the United States. on China. He added that he recently had a good visit to China, during which Poland signed a bilateral defense cooperation agreement.

PARTICIPANTS
------------

¶10. (U) Participants in the meeting with FM Sikorski:
U.S. Participants: -U/S Ellen Tauscher -Ambassador Lee Feinstein
Polish Participants: -FM Radoslaw Sikorski -DFM Jacek Najder -DFM Andrzej Kremer -Director of the Minister’s Secretariat, Michal Miarka

¶11. (U) Participants in the meeting with MOD Klich:
U.S. Participants: -U/S Ellen Tauscher -Ambassador Lee Feinstein -Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Inspection -John Plumb, Principal Director, OSD Missile Defense Policy
Polish Participants: -DefMin Bogdan Klich -Franciszek Gagor, Chief of the General Staff -Lt. General Mieczyslaw Cieniuch -Piotr Pacholski, Director of Missile Defense Office

¶12. (U) U/S Tauscher has reviewed this message. FEINSTEIN
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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9265
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T WARSAW 001228

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ) AND EUR/RPM

EO 12958 DECL: 12/18/2019
TAGS NATO, MCAP, MARR, PREL, PL
SUBJECT: POLAND COULD ACCEPT “COMPLEMENTARY” CONTINGENCY
PLANNING FOR POLAND AND BALTIC STATES

REF: STATE 127892
Classified By: DCM William Heidt for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy DefMin Stanislaw Komorowski and MFA Security Policy Director Adam Kobieracki reacted similarly when DCM raised reftel points -- Poland strongly agrees with the necessity of contingency planning for the Baltic States but would like to avoid delays in the completion of the EAGLE GUARDIAN plan for Poland. However, both Komorowski and Kobieracki suggested that Poland might be able to accept a “creatively packaged” plan that included separate but complementary components (“chapters”) for Poland and the Baltic States. They agreed that discussions should not be made public. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) In a meeting with DCM on December 17, Komorowski expressed satisfaction with the level of cooperation with other NATO contingency planners on EAGLE GUARDIAN. Poles were active participants in the process and looked forward to its completion by the end of February or early March. Komorowski was skeptical that a regional approach to contingency planning was the best way ahead. Komorowski said Warsaw would prefer a unique plan for Poland, although he allowed that Warsaw could accept the notion of two complementary chapters for Poland and the Baltic States within EAGLE GUARDIAN. More important for Poland was the need to avoid any delay in completing the plan or to rehash already-agreed components, such as the threat assessment. He added that he “agreed entirely” that the issue should remain as secret as possible, and that it was in the “common interest” to avoid public discussion of NATO contingency planning.
¶3. (S) Kobieracki made similar points to DCM on December 15, and suggested the USG engage in detailed consultations with Polish officials in Brussels and with the General Staff in Warsaw. He said Poland had hoped that a revised EAGLE GUARDIAN plan could be used as a starting point for developing contingency plans for the Baltic States rather than become intertwined with them. He hinted that a creatively packaged regional plan that met Polish needs in terms of conditionality and automaticity might be acceptable, but cautioned that Warsaw would need assurances that NATO’s defense of Poland was an “issue in its own right” and not dependent on the security or defense of other NATO members. Kobieracki insisted that Poland would also need assurances that regional planning would not negatively impact on NATO’s response to prospective crises, particularly with respect to pre-planned deployments. He urged that completion of EAGLE GUARDIAN not be delayed to accommodate incorporation of the Baltic States into a regional contingency plan. Kobieracki agreed that contingency planning discussions should not be made public. FEINSTEIN
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S E C R E T WARSAW 001139

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CE (GLANTZ), OSD FOR MITCHELL

EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS PREL, MARR, PL
SUBJECT: HLDG: CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS ON U.S. BMD AND
PATRIOT PROPOSALS

REF: WARSAW 972

Classified By: Ambassador Lee Feinstein for reasons 1.4 b and d

¶1. This corrected cable replaces WARSAW 01071.

¶2. (S) SUMMARY. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, led a U.S. delegation to Warsaw for the first-ever U.S.-Poland High Level Defense Group (HLDG). Polish Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Stanislaw Komorowski led the Polish delegation. The discussion on the first day of the HLDG focused on providing more details for U.S. Missile Defense plans and a prospective Polish role in the new concept as well as additional aspects for the deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland for training and exercises. Additionally, the U.S. delegation laid out three potential alternative presence options which, if Poland chose, could replace a Patriot garrison as a post-2012 permanent presence of U.S. Armed Forces. Day 2 of the HLDG focused on strategic discussions, including U.S.-Poland bilateral defense cooperation, Afghanistan, and NATO’s new strategic concept. In addition, the Polish side provided reaction to the possible alternative presence options the U.S. outlined the previous day. Polish reaction to the BMD proposal was positive, though they were disappointed that the SM-3 site would not become operational until 2018, and they sought more information about how early preparations for the deployment could begin. The response to alternative presence options was very positive, both in plenary session and in a small two-on-two dinner meeting the night before. The questions about the Patriot presentation focused on timing and interoperability. END SUMMARY.

¶3. (U) The U.S. delegation included USAF MG Paul Schafer, EUCOM Director, Strategy, Policy, and Assessment; USAF BG John Hesterman, Joint Staff Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs; Ambassador Lee Feinstein, U.S. Embassy Warsaw; DAS Pamela Quanrud, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; DAS Frank Rose, Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; and Ms. Nancy Morgan, MDA Director for International Affairs. The Polish side included Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder; MG Mieczyslaw Gocul, Chief of Strategic Planning Directorate, General Staff of the Armed Forces; and Piotr Pacholski, MOD Director of the Missile Defense Office.
NEW BMD ARCHITECTURE IN EUROPE

¶4. (S) Undersecretary Komorowski began by explaining that Poland understood the reasoning for the U.S. decision to change direction on a European Ballistic Missile Defense program, but that more detail on the threat and the potential SM-3 deployment in Poland would be welcome. Komorowski underscored that Poland wanted to take its responsibility for the decision on whether to take part in the new system seriously and was looking for further details on the system to inform that decision.

¶5. (S) Ambassador Vershbow opened by stating that we know the September 17 briefing on the new U.S. approach had raised many questions. We welcomed this opportunity to explain this approach in greater detail, and why we felt it was a better approach for U.S.-Polish relations and for NATO. Nancy Morgan of the Missile Defense Agency briefed the Polish side on the U.S. Missile Defense Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plan. The brief laid out the objectives for each of the four phases, described the potential role that Poland could play, and illustrated the differences between the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) and the Standard Missile (SM)-3 program. Following the brief, the Polish delegation asked many questions about the importance of Poland’s location for the program, other ways Poland might be able to participate in the system beyond hosting a land-based SM-3 system, and the timing necessary for Poland’s decision. The Poles also asked how the SM-3 system, if deployed in Poland, could become a NATO system, and finally, a series of hypothetical questions on the adaptive nature of the system vis-a-vis the changing threat.

¶6. (S) ASD Vershbow said that with regard to location, Poland was given “right of first refusal” because of its previous commitments and because Poland was a very good site for defending all of Northern Europe. That said, Poland was not the only possibility for a northern European interceptor site. ASD Vershbow said that the timing of activating the Polish site in 2018 rather than 2015 was driven by analysis of the threat, but also by the development timeline of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which was key to providing wide-area protection to allies in Northern Europe. Ambassador Vershbow stressed, however, that preparation of the site could begin well in advance of activation, possibly in 2013, but that we would need to work with Congress to get funding for early site preparation. With regard to how NATO might defend itself from missiles coming from elsewhere than Iran or Syria, BG John Hesterman of the Joint Staff said that sea-borne platforms could provide surge capability against threats from an unforeseen direction, land-based sites could be upgraded with more interceptors if the scale of the threat were increased, and radars could be reoriented. The Poles asked whether proceeding with Phase III when SM-3 Block IIA would be deployed to Poland was firm or would die if perception of the threat receded. ASD Vershbow reassured the Poles of U.S. commitment on this point.

PATRIOT PHASE 1 WILL NOT BE OPERATIONAL

¶7. (S) Following delivery of the Non-Paper providing further definition to the US policy regarding Patriot rotations, LTC Sean Gainey from U.S. Army Europe briefed the concept for the Phase 1 rotations of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland. In response to a direct question from Komorowski following the brief, ASD Vershbow emphasized that the rotations will be solely for training and exercises and would not add to Polish air defense capabilities, and Maj Gen Schafer reinforced the point made by the interagency cleared Patriot non-paper that the Patriot battery would not be operational at any time. The U.S. delegation asserted that the U.S. is committed to doing quarterly rotations in Poland through 2012. However, it was made clear that training opportunities would be limited to basic familiarization training due to current disclosure restrictions unless Poland decided to buy Patriot systems. ASD Vershbow also reiterated that a deployment of a Patriot battery would not take place without a ratified Supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SSA). However, the U.S. would, on the basis of continued progress on SOFA negotiations, move forward with bilateral planning for a March 2010 deployment in good faith that the SSA would soon be brought into force.

ALTERNATIVE PRESENCE OPTIONS IN PLACE OF PATRIOT GARRISON

¶8. (S) Near the end of Day 1 discussions, ASD Vershbow presented new options for potential cooperation which the U.S. believed may be more useful to Poland than Patriot rotations. He explained that we looked at other alternative programs that would be affordable for both countries, would assist in the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, would help Poland better meet its NATO force goals, and would be sustainable by the U.S. military. The three options presented were: 1) a quarterly rotation of F-16s, and the establishment of a small permanent support detachment, which would focus on enhancing Polish fighter capabilities, increasing sortie readiness and meeting NATO commitments; 2) quarterly C-130 rotations from Ramstein AFB, also with a small permanent support detachment in Poland with the goal of increasing Polish readiness and ability to support own and NATO operations; 3) the relocation of a U.S. Naval Special Warfare unit from Stuttgart to Gdansk or Gdynia. The Polish delegation accepted U.S. unwillingness to discuss Patriot Phase 2 and the garrison until after consideration of the alternate presence options, and the atmosphere in the room was positive and constructive. Komorowski also said both in a small meeting preceding the HLDG and in plenary that the Patriot’s contribution to Polish air defense is minimal, though important symbolically.

¶9. (S) At the start of Day 2, the Polish delegation presented its initial reactions to the alternative presence proposals. Undersecretary Komorowski said he believed the proposal for F-16 rotations was his favorite. The reactions from the Polish experts included many questions of detail: when could the rotations arrive, how many planes would each rotation have, how many people would be in the permanent support unit, would the U.S. be able to provide tanker and AWACS support, and would the rotation only operate in Poland, or would it be allowed to train Polish ground and air crews? EUCOM pledged to follow up with more detailed discussions on these proposals at a later date. To the three proposals, Undersecretary Komorowski added a fourth for the U.S. to consider - as an additional rather than a replacement for any of the U.S. proposals. Noting that Polish Minister of
Defense Bogdan Klich planned to sign an agreement with his Ukrainian counterpart that very day establishing the framework for a combined Polish-Ukrainian-Lithuanian Brigade that would be stood up for international deployments by 2013, Komorowski asked if it would be possible for U.S. involvement in this brigade, either assigning some forces or stationing officers at the permanent headquarters to be located in Lublin.

DEFENSE COOPERATION

¶10. (S) Undersecretary Komorowski defined the Polish approach to defense cooperation by dividing proposals for new programs into two categories: Afghanistan deployment assistance and programs funded through Foreign Military Financing (FMF). On Afghanistan, Komorowski detailed a “wishlist” for U.S. cooperation including better help on UAVs and other sensors, giving Poland access to “Four Eyes”-level intelligence by making it a Fifth Eye, increased U.S. provision of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and the building of a runway in Ghazni to support C-130 flights. On FMF, Komorowski stated that Poland wishes to focus mainly on C4ISR purchases to increase the interoperability of Polish military equipment. BG Hesterman of the Joint Staff related that the Chairman has a lot of empathy for Poland’s MRAP issues based on our own experiences with IEDs and that the Chairman remains fully engaged in assisting Poland in this critical area. On the runway question, Hesterman reiterated what the Chairman told the Polish CHOD in June that the U.S. is willing to assist with contracting support coordination to build the extension. He added that with the Afghanistan strategy and resourcing under review and decisions pending in our capital and others, that there could be more developments in this area.

AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL CHALLENGES

¶11. (S) Deputy Foreign Minister Jacek Najder, the Polish Plenipotentiary for Afghanistan, provided a Polish strategic overview for Afghanistan. He concurred with COMISAF’s assessment that the Alliance had lost the strategic initiative and that NATO was not keeping pace with the insurgents. In Ghazni province, where Poland is focusing most of its attention, voting irregularities were high. While Poland is also disappointed with the way the election played out, Najder asserted that regardless of whether there is a run-off, the challenge will be in incorporating the lessons learned from the August election so that the 2010 Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan function better. Najder also called for a greater regional focus to expand to both India and Iran. Finally, Najder stressed that Poland remained in Afghanistan because of NATO and the importance that NATO has to Poland’s national security. However, he believed that NATO should delink success in Afghanistan with evaluations of NATO’s overall success. Komorowski emphasized that Poland was committed to the pledge of “in together, out together” on Afghanistan. However, he noted the difficulty for Polish politicians in reconciling the high public support for Polish membership in NATO with public support for consequences and responsibilities such as operation in Afghanistan, which come with NATO membership.

¶12. (S) ASD Vershbow noted that President Obama was still reviewing the recommendations of COMISAF and his resource requests, but emphasized that the U.S. would not turn away from Afghanistan, which was a test of NATO’s credibility. He agreed that it would be better to expand the discussion with Iran to encourage better behavior, but said that this was unlikely to succeed in the short term. In response to questions on the role of Russia in Afghanistan, ASD Vershbow recalled that Russia also wants to contain many of the threats to Russia, including terrorism and narcotics trafficking, but was also sensitive about the U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recalling the July agreement for air transit of lethal goods through Russia, ASD Vershbow stated his belief that NATO and the U.S. could find additional ways to partner with Russia on Afghanistan.

NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT: DEFENSE OVER SECURITY

¶13. (C) Komorowski declared that it was time for a new document, not just the alteration of the 1999 Strategic Concept. He said that the most important aspect of the new strategic concept for Poland will be the reaffirmation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as the most important agreement between the Allies, and that Article 5 shall take
precedence over expeditionary operations. Noting that the strategic environment had changed, he stated his belief that a new doctrine was needed that would expand NATO’s capabilities to deal with its members’ obligations under Article 5. Komorowski explained that while out-of-area operations were valid NATO missions, that the new Strategic Concept must clearly state that NATO’s door remained open as well as introduce clarity into how NATO deals with its international partners, especially Russia. Komorowski related that Poland’s member of the “wise persons” group, Adam Rotfeld, was consulting with other central European countries to give them the sense that their input was taken in the process. Minister Najder concluded by simply stating that NATO remained a defense alliance, not a security organization.

¶14. (C) ASD Vershbow remarked that both countries came at the issue from a similar perspective. NATO, in his opinion, needed a shorter, crisper document which would be more accessible to both parliaments and public and better made the case for an increase in resources to meet NATO’s full mission set. There was a need to find the proper balance between Article 5 and expeditionary missions. Observing that Article 5 may need to be viewed more broadly to encompass non-military threats like cyber-attacks. ASD Vershbow cautioned that we would need to have a strategy with real meaning, backed up by planning, exercises, and capabilities. He said it was clear that zero growth of the NATO budget was unsustainable with the expansion of NATO missions and we needed to look at common funding and other reforms and get more value for money.

¶15. (S) COMMENT. In marked contrast to September 17, the mood of the two days of HLDG discussions was positive and constructive. The Polish delegation listened to U.S. proposals on BMD and Patriot, and both sides conveyed a sense that real progress was made. Concerns exist on the Polish side at having to wait until 2018 for SM-3 site activation, but the possibility raised by ASD Vershbow of early site preparation helped mitigate the concern. The Poles asked specific questions in an effort to determine whether Phase 1 Patriot rotations would have any operational capacity, but seemed to accept the fact that they would not and that this was the established U.S. position (despite the public comments of Komorowski following the meeting). The Polish side was prepared to defer discussion of the Phase 2 Patriot garrison, and the alternative presence options generated favorable interest. The question moving forward is the extent to which this constructive progress will be felt higher in the Polish government, particularly by Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. END COMMENT

¶16. (U) ASD Vershbow has reviewed and cleared this cable.

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER PL
SUBJECT: RETHINKING U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE: VIEW
FROM POLAND

REF: A. USNATO 329
¶B. BERLIN 935
¶C. WARSAW 360

Classified By: Ambassador Victor Ashe for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Embassy Warsaw believes there would be a
strong, negative Polish reaction to major U.S. force
reductions in Europe. From Poland,s perspective, a big
drawdown would be seen as evidence that the U.S. is less
committed to European security at a time of heightened
concern over the intentions of a resurgent Russia. Polish
officials have emphasized the need for NATO to bolster its
military capabilities to avoid becoming a political club more
than a military alliance. They are adamant about revising
NATO,s Strategic Concept to restore the balance between
external missions and territorial defense; they will strongly
protest a reduction in the resources needed for that defense.
The Poles tell us that it would be hard to justify continued
sacrifices in missions like ISAF if cooperation with the
Alliance is a one-way street, and the U.S. and other Allies
do not take Polish security concerns into account. END
SUMMARY.

¶2. (S) The Poles believe they have an implicit
understanding with the United States and the Alliance: they
will take active part in missions far from their borders,
particularly in Afghanistan, provided that the Alliance makes
adequate provisions for the defense of Poland,s borders.
Poland is ISAF,s seventh leading troop contributor, fighting
without caveats in Southern Afghanistan, and Foreign Minister
Sikorski told us recently that he is pressing Prime Minister
Tusk to approve another troop increase, from 2,000 to 3,000
soldiers. Some analysts have told us (Ref C) that the
greatest threat to Polish resolve in Afghanistan would not be
increased casualties, but a failure by the Alliance to
address Poland,s concerns about Europe,s territorial
defense. Poland would see U.S. troop cuts as compounding
shortfalls in the resources and political will needed to
defend Europe.

¶3. (S) Unlike the previous Polish government, the Tusk
government is not reflexively Russophobic, but Polish
officials remain concerned about a resurgent Russia. The GoP
took the lead in marshalling an EU reaction to Russia,s
invasion of Georgia, and faulted the U.S., among others, for
doing too little, too late. In a speech at the Atlantic
Council last year, the Foreign Minister launched the
&Sikorski doctrine8: the West must respond adequately the
next time Russia tries to change Europe,s borders by force.

¶4. (S) Foreign Minister Sikorski has told U.S. leaders
emphatically that NATO risks becoming a political club more
than a military alliance ) he believes it needs to change
the politically correct threat assessments (particularly
those concerning Russia), and put in place substantial
contingency planning and exercises. During bilateral talks
with the U.S. on Missile Defense, the Poles implied that the
Alliance,s Article V guarantees may not be dependable, and
pressed for bilateral U.S. security guarantees. As NATO
launches the process of revising NATO,s Strategic Concept,
the Poles are pushing hard to restore balance between
out-of-area operations and territorial defense. Polish
officials have hinted at how strong the reaction would be if
their concerns are not addressed in the new Strategic
Concept; the reaction would doubtless be even stronger if
they perceived strategic guidance as undercut by U.S. force
reductions.

¶5. (S) Poland would see significant U.S. force reductions
in Europe as the latest in a series of disappointments with
the U.S.: in their view, the U.S. failed to deliver promised
Iraqi contracts, to bring a loyal Ally into the Visa Waiver
Program, and most recently, to appoint an appropriately
high-level presidential delegation to the September 1
commemoration in Gdansk of the 70th anniversary of the
outbreak of World War II. Many Poles see this as part of a
broader regional trend, a downgrading of U.S. interest in
Central and Eastern Europe. Three Polish statesmen, Lech
Walesa, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Adam Daniel Rotfeld, were
among the signatories of the July letter from Central
European leaders to President Obama. The letter warned that
the region,s stability and Atlanticist outlook cannot be
taken for granted in the face of allegedly waning U.S.
engagement.

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EO 12958 DECL: 04/20/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MARR, OREP, RS, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND - CODEL LEVIN DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE,
PATRIOTS

REF: WARSAW 375

Classified By: Ambassador Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In meetings with CODEL Levin, the Polish Prime Minister’s chief of staff, the President’s deputy national security advisor, and the speaker of the Polish parliament expressed unanimous support for a large U.S. military footprint in Poland to bolster Article 5 guarantees. PM chief of staff Slawomir Nowak told CODEL that, regardless of the U.S. decision on Missile Defense, Poland expects the U.S. to “honor its commitments” to bring a Patriot battery to Poland. All three Polish officials requested that the U.S. keep Poland updated on the status of dialogue with Russia, suggesting that Russia, not Iran, poses the greater threat to Poland. CODEL’s meeting with FM Sikorski is reported septel. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), and Senator Susan Collins (R-ME), visited Warsaw April 15-16 to discuss Missile Defense and Polish interest in a U.S. Patriot battery rotation with Polish officials, including Prime Minister Tusk’s chief of staff Slawomir Nowak, Deputy Chief of President Kaczynski’s National Security Bureau Witold Waszczykowski, and Parliamentary Speaker Bronislaw Komorowski (Civic Platform, PO). The Senators’ meetings with Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Deputy Defense Minister Stanislaw Komorowski are reported septel.

U.S. “ROCK SOLID” ON ARTICLE FIVE

¶3. (C) Senator Levin began all three meetings by conveying the President’s message that the U.S. commitment to the NATO Article 5 guarantee is “rock solid.” While U.S. support for Poland may differ in form under the Obama administration, U.S. support for Poland will be strong. When asked whether Warsaw felt assured that NATO would honor its Article 5 commitments to Poland, Waszczykowski said “we still have our doubts,” adding that some European members -- particularly France -- prefer talk to action, he wryly added “that’s why we bought F-16s and not French Mirages, and why we went through with the Missile Defense deal.”

PATRIOTS AND AMERICAN BOOTS

¶4. (C) Senator Levin warned all three interlocutors that if the Czechs reject the proposed MD radar site, the Polish component of MD would be put in jeopardy under current U.S. legislation. Nowak expressed confidence that the Czechs would ratify the agreement with the U.S., suggesting they are simply waiting for a U.S. decision on MD. Speaker Komorowski acknowledged the provisions of U.S. law, but stated Poland does not want to be responsible for Czech problems. Senator Collins acknowledged the political cost to Poland of supporting MD, and asked for Komorowski,s views on how to maintain support for the United States if it pursues a different course.

¶5. (C) Asked whether Poland would be reassured by the presence of Patriot batteries in lieu of MD, Nowak told CODEL Levin that, regardless of MD’s fate, the GOP expects the USG to “honor its commitments” on Patriots. Poland intends to build a comprehensive air-defense system and has identified Patriots as “the most important element” of its defense modernization efforts. Nowak said Poland “will not suffer” if the U.S. withdraws from MD, but repeatedly asserted that the GOP is “counting on Patriots.” (NB: At one point, Nowak even intervened when his interpreter mistakenly said the Poles “would like Patriots.” “No, we are counting on them,” Nowak emphasized in English.)

¶6. (C) Waszczykowski was less adamant about Patriots, stating that Poland and the U.S. had a binding political agreement on security matters, which he hoped the United States would respect. He added that Poland “wants U.S. boots on the ground” -- not necessarily as a tripwire, but as a deterrent. Nowak similarly stressed Poland’s strong interest in “deepening” military cooperation, ideally to include a large U.S. footprint in Poland. He mused that one Patriot battery and ten MD interceptors do not constitute the “impressive presence” that Poland is hoping for.

¶7. (C) Speaker Komorowski and Nowak both pointed out that, by agreeing to host the MD site, Poland had paid a “high price” -- especially in its relations with other EU members and with Russia. Komorowski expressed concern that Poland had again become a Russian target after a dozen years of improving relations -- senior Russian officials have threatened to target Poland with nuclear missiles, are stirring up
WARSAW 00000467 002 OF 002
anti-Polish sentiment among Russians, and are acting against Poland’s interests in Ukraine.

¶8. (C) Komorowski argued that the U.S. needs to fulfill its symbolic agreement to show involvement in defense of Polish territory. If the new administration is changing U.S. political priorities, it also needs to engage in dialogue with Poland, not just Russia. Most important for Poland is U.S. involvement in Polish security, through physical presence of American forces in Poland, NATO facilities in Poland, fulfilling the commitment to provide Patriot missiles, and greater U.S.-Polish cooperation.

DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

¶9. (C) Komorowski, Nowak, and Waszczykowski stressed the importance of keeping Poland updated on the status of U.S.-Russia talks. Nowak stressed the GOP’s strong interest in a positive outcome, but reminded the CODEL that U.S. negotiators had promised the USG would overcome Russian objections to MD. “The MD site is an American base. The burden of achieving Russian agreement is on the U.S. side,” he said. Even so, Nowak said, Poland had agreed to accept confidence-building measures with the Russians and was also working to convince Moscow that MD is not a threat to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Regardless, Russia will find it difficult to accept any “tangible manifestation” of a NATO presence in Poland or the Czech Republic.

¶10. (C) Nowak said Poland had not discussed Patriots with the Russians. Russia should not have a say in Poland’s defense modernization planning. Noting that Poland’s armed forces are “defensive in nature,” Nowak reiterated that Poland’s primary goal is to increase interoperability with allies.

¶11. (C) Presidential Advisor Waszczykowski reacted more emotionally. While Washington is entitled to talk to Russia, to work toward a solution to the Iranian threat, and to make its own decision about the MD initiative, the U.S. should take care not to undermine Poland’s security. He then wondered aloud, “How long will it take you to realize that nothing will change with Iran and Russia?” Waszczykowski asserted that Moscow is trying to regain its sphere of influence and stressed the critical importance of an increased U.S. or NATO presence for Poland’s security. He added that Russia continues to deny its historical wrong-doings against Poland, imposes economic sanctions against Poland at will, and frequently disrupts the flow of oil and gas.

THREAT FROM IRAN?

¶12. (C) In all three meetings, Senator Nelson expressed doubt that Iran would abandon its nuclear weapons or missile programs, but noted that the Iranian threat to Europe could be met for the foreseeable future with the AEGIS and THAAD systems. Waszczykowski, who served as Poland’s Ambassador to Tehran (1999-2002), agreed that Iran poses an increasing threat to the United States and Europe. He said that the Iranian regime has no incentive to warm relations with Washington because the regime has built its own legitimacy on the cornerstone of anti-Americanism.

¶13. (C) Nowak and Komorowski told the CODEL that Poland does not perceive a direct threat from Iran. Nowak stated that, as an active and loyal ally, Poland had agreed to host the MD site because of the threat Iran poses to the U.S. and others in NATO. He noted that Poland’s desire to be a strong ally was also the basis for its activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nowak said Poland perceives a greater threat from non-state actors, but conceded that Iran’s support for terrorist organizations was troubling. He added that Poland’s decision to host MD had moved it “closer to the top of Iran’s list,” and, as a result, made Patriots more important to Poland’s security.

¶14. (U) CODEL Levin has cleared this message.
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EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS PREL, MAPP, PL

SUBJECT: POLAND WANTS LIVE PATRIOTS, “NOT POTTED PLANTS”

REF: 10 AUGUST 2008 U.S. NON PAPER ON DEPLOYMENT OF A U.S. PATRIOT BATTERY IN POLAND

Classified By: Ambassador Victor H. Ashe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY. GOP officials are not privy to the full range of U.S. planning and thinking with regard to the prospective Patriot battery rotation here, but they do have expectations -- some naive, some tactical -- that they are making increasingly clear. For example, when told last autumn that the Patriots would not be integrated -- at least initially -- into the Polish air defense system, Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski angrily responded that Poland expected to have operational missiles, not “potted plants.” Merited or no, our Polish interlocutors believe: 1) (assuming successful SoFA talks) Patriots will start rotating to Poland this year regardless of the outcome of Washington’s review of the Missile Defense program; 2) the battery will have some undefined “operational capability;” 3) the garrison remaining in Poland after 2012 will have the same size and composition as the uniformed elements that will staff the rotations; and 4) access to Patriot equipment for training will not be substantially impeded by provisions of the Export Control Act. To help us manage these issues, this cable lays out what we understand about Polish expectations and the backstory of how they got there. END SUMMARY.

PATRIOTS AND MD - CONNECTED OR NO?

¶2. (S) The proposed Patriot rotation was a condition of Polish agreement to sign the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA), and the U.S. would likely not have offered it outside of that context. A (very) simplified recounting of the story of how we got here seems in order.

¶3. (S) The question of Patriots in Poland hung (largely silently) over the BMDA negotiations for much of last spring. The final breakthrough in the BMDA negotiations in fact came with a July 7 Polish non-paper, which indicated a GOP willingness to contribute to the deployment of a Patriot battery in Poland. The U.S. non-paper response of 10 August said that “in the context of a broader and deeper bilateral security relationship, including the deployment of missile defense interceptors in Poland, the United States is prepared to deploy a U.S. Army Patriot battery in Poland (emphasis added).” The Patriot deployment plans were made public in the Declaration of Strategic Cooperation, signed at the time of the BMDA, where we agreed to intensify our security and defense cooperation, including through “the deployment of a U.S. Army Patriot air and missile defense system in Poland” starting in 2009.

¶4. (S) Since then both sides have used this connection to urge greater negotiating energy on the part of the other: the U.S. saying clearly that it will not move forward on Patriots without ratification of the BMDA and SOFA (a condition outlined in the 10 August non-paper), and the Poles moving cautiously at times on SOFA talks out of concern that the U.S. is not on schedule for a 2009 commencement of the Patriot rotation. Correctly or not, the Poles believe that ratification of SoFA and the BMDA gets them Patriots in 2009, independent of a USG decision on BMD, and that the Strategic Declaration signed at the time of the BMDA stands on its own. They have even turned our language on us in making the point, asking that the U.S. not be so “transactional” in tying its obligations to Poland’s defense to new thinking about interceptors.

WHEN IS A PATRIOT A PATRIOT?

¶5. (S) The Declaration of Strategic Cooperation outlines some parameters for the proposed Patriot “deployment,” allowing that a Patriot battery rotation “will include joint training opportunities that will enhance Polish air defense capabilities.” The Poles interpret “will include” to mean “not limited to” and they expect that Polish air defenses will be enhanced in some operational capacity by the Patriot rotation. Repeated U.S. statements since August 2008 that the battery will not be operational are interpreted by the Poles to be part of a larger discussion of C4ISR and the inter-operability of Patriot in their overall air defense architecture. After months of back and forth, we think the Poles now understand that the rotation battery will not be fully operational and cannot be integrated immediately into the Polish system and that the battery will focus on training and exercises.

¶6. (S) However, this is a good juncture to point out the most glaring gap in understanding between us and the Poles. The Poles have not been told that the battery will rotate without actual missiles -- i.e., not only will the rotation not be operational in the initial phase (due to C4ISR and other issues) but it will also not be operational, and certainly interoperable, at any point in our current plans. This will be a question of basic definitions for the Poles: is it a Patriot battery if it doesn’t have live missiles? The Poles think the Patriots will become not only operable, but interoperable, over time - thus enhancing Poland’s air defense. When told last Fall that the Patriots would not be operational, at least at first, Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski angrily responded that Poland expected to receive operational Patriot missiles, “not potted plants.”

WHAT IS A GARRISON? WHAT IS JOINT TRAINING?

¶7. (S) The GOP also has a different concept of the footprint involved when the U.S. agreed (also in the Declaration) to establish a “garrison to support the U.S. Army Patriot battery” by 2012. The Poles believe the permanent battery arrangement will have around 110 personnel -- about the same number required to staff planned temporary rotations between 2009 and 2012 -- which is to say that the Poles expect the “garrison” to convert the rotation itself into a permanent presence. Current U.S. planning appears to call for only 20-30 permanent personnel to maintain forward deployed equipment. In addition, the Poles understand that technology transfer regulations would normally restrict their access to Patriot equipment for purposes of training and exercises, but have interpreted the clause in the Declaration allowing for “joint training opportunities” to mean that they will have greater access to technology than is generally granted by the Export Control Act.

COMMENT

¶8. (S) We need to navigate the way forward carefully. We may be able to close some of the gaps between our plans and the Poles expectations with time and focus and patience on both sides. However, the “potted plant” problem, is much more tricky. Prime Minister Tusk, neither a fan of MD nor as wed to the U.S.-Polish strategic relationship as his predecessors, sold the BMDA to the Polish public as enhancing Polish security because of the Patriot agreement. Assuming the European missile site plans don’t completely wither on the vine, the Poles will expect the Patriot rotation to not only go forward, but to have some operational, if not eventual interoperational capability. As we move forward, we will want to be careful not to stumble into this chasm. We need a strategy for how we will consult with the Poles to close the gap before it undoes much good work to date.

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Husarz
Posty: 822
Rejestracja: 31 paź 2010, 04:37

Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: Husarz » 08 gru 2010, 06:46

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV BO GG UP RS PL
SUBJECT: POLAND: A NATURAL U.S. ALLY ON EASTERN POLICY

REF: A. STATE 111058
¶B. WARSAW 1010
¶C. STOCKHOLM 792

Classified By: DCM Quanrud for reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Like us, Poland seeks to draw key countries
on the eastern boundary of Europe, like Ukraine and Georgia,
towards Western institutions. An increasingly active regional
player, Poland has evolved since 1989 from aid-recipient to
donor, helping us to spur reforms in the region. Warsaw has
lead EU engagement with its eastern neighbors through the
joint Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership proposal, which was
accelerated in the shadow of the Georgia crisis and is now
embedded in European Commission strategy. Yet growing
self-confidence and an historical distrust of Russia can
sometimes lead Poland to get too far out in front -- like
when the Poles transferred sensitive armaments to Georgia and
took a gamble by pushing through the sudden removal of most
EU sanctions against Belarus. Despite the occasional
overstepping, Poland's Eastern Policy is an excellent
complement to our own, and projects like the Eastern
Partnership merit our support. END SUMMARY.

STRATEGY BEHIND EASTERN PARTNERSHIP
-----------------------------------

¶2. (C) The Eastern Partnership -- a proposal championed by
Poland and Sweden to deepen EU relations with Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan --
embraces the central goals of Poland's increasingly active
regional policy:

-- Counter Russia's influence in Eastern Europe (although
Russia is officially welcome to take part in the Partnership);
-- Energize EU engagement with eastern neighbors in the
face of enlargement fatigue; and
-- Entice former Soviet states to embrace Western
democratic and free-market principles by offering tangible
benefits -- particularly a free trade area and eventual
visa-free travel.

¶3. (C) The Eastern Partnership and other Polish policies in
the region aim to counter a resurgent Russia. Foreign
Minister Sikorski told U.S. officials the GoP used to think
Russia would be a danger in 10-15 years, but after the
Georgia crisis, it could be as little as 10-15 months.
Polish analysts tell us having a pro-Western buffer zone in
Ukraine and Belarus would keep Poland off the front line with
an increasingly assertive Russia. By offering former Soviet
republics the prospect of free trade and visa-free travel to
the EU, the Eastern Partnership can spur the reforms needed
for eventual EU membership and stem growing Russian
influence. MFA officials note that the holder of a Russian
passport in Georgia currently faces fewer travel restrictions
in Europe than a holder of a Georgian passport. On the
economic front, Polish officials believe a larger western
business presence in countries like Belarus and Ukraine will
provide an alternative to Russian state-controlled companies,
and EU good governance programs can fight the corruption that
facilitates Russian political and economic influence.

¶4. (C) Convinced that the EU has greater leverage with Moscow
than do individual Member States, the Tusk Government has
shed the confrontational rhetoric of its predecessor and
sought to build coalitions among EU members. Foreign
Minister Sikorski developed the Eastern Partnership with
Swedish FM Bildt, and Polish and Swedish embassies in EU
capitals jointly lobbied other Member States to support the
package. EU colleagues in Warsaw praise the undertaking as a
real coming of age for Poland in the EU. Tusk has also
striven to improve relations with Germany, which the Polish
MFA hopes will bring more financial backing for the Eastern
Partnership. The Prime Minister struck a deal with Paris in
March 2008 to support French proposals on the EU's southern
dimension initiative in exchange for France's support for the
Partnership.

¶5. (C) Poland itself has evolved from aid recipient to
assistance provider, bilaterally allocating PLN 26 million
(USD 8.7 million) to Belarus and PLN 16 million (USD 5.3
million) to Ukraine in 2008. The aid will enhance
independent broadcasting media, border cooperation, public
administration, and people-to-people contacts. Poland has
also committed 6 million euro (USD 7.8 million) to Georgia
for the period 2008-2010. Robert Tyszkiewicz, the Deputy
Chair of the Sejm's Foreign Relations Committee, described
Poland's assistance as "modest, but useful and credible,
because we struggled with many of the same post-Communist
challenges." MFA officials have called for a high-level
strategic dialogue between Washington and Brussels -- with

WARSAW 00001409 002 OF 003


Polish participation -- on targeting assistance to eastern
neighbors.

STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL SECURITY UMBRELLA
--------------------------------------------

¶6. (S) To complement increased EU engagement, Warsaw seeks to
bolster the U.S. and NATO security stance in Eastern Europe.
Polish officials perceive Russia's invasion of Georgia in
August as a vindication of their warnings about Moscow,s
aggressive behavior. According to the "Sikorski Doctrine,"
any further attempt by Russia to redraw borders by force or
subversion should be regarded by Europe as a threat to its
security, entailing a proportional response by the entire
Euro-Atlantic community. Poland has pushed hard for Ukraine
and Georgia's NATO accession, and called on NATO to make sure
it can make good on Article V guarantees. Sikorski has
complained that NATO has evolved into a political club with
no teeth and warned that Poland would not be able to ignore a
repetition of the Georgia scenario in Ukraine. He has also
told U.S. officials that, in light of Russian excesses in
Georgia, Poland's risky policy of arming the Georgians with
MANPADS proved the right thing to do despite USG objections
(Ref B).

¶7. (C) Poland's perennial concerns about the adequacy of its
Allies' security guarantees played a key role in the decision
to sign the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) with
the U.S. The GoP wants US/NATO boots (and infrastructure) on
the ground so that the U.S. will feel obliged to defend
Poland's territorial sovereignty in the event of a conflict.
Immediately after Russia's invasion of Georgia, Tusk
emphasized Poland's sense of vulnerability when he asked
high-level U.S. officials, "Now do you see why we wanted the
Patriot missiles and further security guarantees (as
requested during the Missile Defense talks)?"

RUSH TO REDUCE MINSK SANCTIONS
------------------------------

¶8. (C) The Polish government -- lead by Sikorski -- pushed
through the temporary repeal of almost all EU visa sanctions
against Belarusian President Lukashenka's regime, despite USG
calls for a more gradual easing of sanctions. Sikorski
publicly suggested the U.S. was engaging in double standards
because of our close relations with a "dictatorship in Saudi
Arabia, but not in Belarus." Both Sikorski and Tusk
acknowledge that the GoP risks being perceived as embracing a
dictator; but they argue that engaging Belarus is
particularly important after the Russian invasion of Georgia.
The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister told U.S. officials
in August that Poland is responding to Belarus' signals of
interest in dialogue, and, like the U.S., to the release of
political prisoners in Belarus.

¶9. (C) Tusk and Sikorski see engagement with Belarusian
authorities as the lesser of two evils. In the Poles' view,
an isolated Belarus could become completely ensnared by
Russia, with or without Lukashenka in power. Russian
domination would jeopardize democratic transformation and --
more importantly, in Warsaw's view -- would dash hopes that
Belarus could become a buffer state between Poland and
Russia. The GoP is betting that Lukashenka enjoys enough
power to resist the elimination of independent Belarusian
institutions and maintain his freedom of maneuver. MFA
officials tell us that in response to the lifting of EU visa
sanctions, Belarus has signaled Brussels that Minsk would
ease some media restrictions.

CHALLENGES AHEAD
----------------

¶10. (C) MFA officials understand Poland's eastern policies
could elicit a sharp Russian reaction, but they see a greater
danger in doing nothing since they believe a resurgent,
aggressive Russia is here to stay. Poland has sought to
mitigate the risk of a backlash by maintaining a cordial
dialogue with Moscow and pursuing a united US-EU front
vis-a-vis Russia on sensitive energy and security issues.
President Lech Kaczynski, the Prime Minister's top political
rival, takes a more confrontational approach to Russia; he
often visits Georgia and makes pronouncements there without
coordinating with the government. To a certain extent,
Kaczynski's lurching east takes pressure off the Tusk
Government to be tough in public with Russia, but the two
leaders' divergent approaches could also hamper their ability
to achieve the shared goal of extending European and
trans-Atlantic institutions eastward.

¶11. (C) The Eastern Partnership competes for EU financing
with other projects, particularly the Union's Southern

WARSAW 00001409 003 OF 003


Initiative with Mediterranean countries. The European
Commission's Eastern Partnership proposal included a request
for 350 million euro in fresh funds for 2010-13, which was
much less than the 600 million euro sum originally proposed
by Poland and Sweden. In contrast to the Southern
Initiative, the Partnership lacks a high-level special
coordinator who can advocate on the program's behalf within
the EU bureaucracy. Polish MFA officials also point out that
the success of the program depends on identifying and
implementing credible projects.

HELPING THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUCCEED
---------------------------------------

¶12. (C) Poland can be a reliable ally as we looks for ways to
enhance western influence beyond NATO's eastern borders.
Russian President Medvedev's threat to deploy Iskander
missiles in Kaliningrad in response to the Missile Defense
program has redoubled Polish determination to work with the
U.S. and the EU to shore up its eastern neighbors as a
bulwark against Russian encroachment. It is also very much
in our interest to work closely with Warsaw, Brussels, and
the incoming Czech and Swedish EU presidencies to ensure the
Partnership's success in enhancing EU ties with its eastern
neighborhood.
ASHE
Proszę o komentarze :-D

Awatar użytkownika
Adambik
Posty: 501
Rejestracja: 24 lis 2010, 22:41

Re: Wikileaks a sprawa polska

Post autor: Adambik » 08 gru 2010, 07:37

Beż honoru. Amerykanie pokazali czym są dla nich Polacy. Sprzedają Polakom świecidełka, a Polacy klepią o sojuszu. Sojusz człowieka z małpą. Tak można określić "sojusz" Polski i USA.

ODPOWIEDZ

Wróć do „Polska polityka zagraniczna”